We develop a rationale for roll call voting and position-taking in legislatures using a formal model of legislative vote-buying and elections. In our model, citizens and an interest group are motivated by policy, while legislators are motivated by holding office. The group may attempt to buy legislators' votes by offering contracts based on their votes. If citizens cannot condition their re-election votes on legislators' roll calls, then in equilibrium the group will buy its ideal policy and most legislators are voted out of office. This is because the group's contract can promise a non-negligible payment to each legislator only in the event that her vote is pivotal, but also force no legislator to be pivotal. If citizens can condition their votes on legislators' roll calls, then policies are more moderate and more legislators are re-elected. Thus an endogenous preference for position-taking arises in a legislature with public roll calls, and both legislators and citizens will prefer such "open" proceedings ex ante. We explore extensions of the basic model and find some circumstances where the incentives to have open proceedings are weaker.
Introduction
Members of the U.S. House and Senate devote much time and energy to "positiontaking" activities-introducing and co-sponsoring bills, making speeches, and building rollcall records that are in tune with their constituents.
1 These activities are not easily explained by appealing to members' policy preferences, because they appear to engage in them regardless of the policy consequences. Members introduce bills that are sure to die in committee, they make long speeches on the floor even when the chamber is almost empty, and they carefully consider how to vote even on roll calls where the outcome is a foregone conclusion.
Instead, it is widely believed that members engage in position-taking activities in order to improve their chances of reelection. And, numerous studies suggest that these efforts pay off. In particular, House and Senate members whose roll-call voting records do not fit their districts or are very extreme receive smaller vote-shares than other members.
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Both houses of the U.S. Congress and all state legislatures have rules allowing a small minority of the legislature to demand a recorded vote on any bill or amendment on the floor.
In fact, more than 40 state legislatures require recorded votes on the third reading or final passage of all bills. Cross-nationally, almost all legislatures in the industrialized democracies have similar provisions allowing a minority of representatives to demand roll call votes.
3
Most observers take this evident preference for openness and position-taking as given, especially in the U.S. context. But to others it is more puzzling, both normatively and positively. Followers of Edmund Burke, for example, favor "collective representation," in which the legislature as a whole is expected to be responsive to the citizenry as a whole, to "dyadic representation," where each representative pays close attention to his or her constituents. The latter often produces a legislature that disregards the national public interest. 4 Empirical analyses suggest that collective representation is at work in practice, even in the U.S..
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It is also not obvious that legislators will prefer open procedures with roll calls on all votes.
Challengers can take particular roll calls out of context and use them to attack incumbents during election campaigns. This might make vote-trading in the legislature difficult, and/or reduce the capacity of the majority party to pass key bills. 6 Similarly, if legislators know that they will sometimes accede to pressure from interest groups, then they may want to be able to pass or kill legislation without a recorded vote. This will allow legislators to try to duck such issues during elections, by claiming, for example, that they did their best for the people but were outvoted.
Finally, some rational choice theorists are puzzled by voters' behavior in the dyadic model of representation. Assuming that voters care about legislative outcomes, why should they punish or reward their individual representative at the polls depending on that representative's roll call votes? Wouldn't it be better for voters to punish or reward their legislators on the basis of what they care about, outcomes? This is, in fact, one of the rationales for collective representation.
In this paper we present a model that allows us to begin assessing the costs and benefits of open procedures and address these puzzles.
Our model highlights one potentially large cost of closed procedures in which votes are hidden from voters. The logic is as follows. Suppose that in addition to legislators and voters, there is an interest group that faces no organized opposition. Suppose also that this group can observe roll calls and offer the legislators bribes based on their votes. If voters condition their voting decisions on outcomes, then they can induce outcome-based preferences in their legislators-that is, they can cause their legislators to act as if they had outcome-based preferences. However, if legislators only have outcome-based preferences, then the interest but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole-where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole." (Quoted in Birch, 1971, page 39) . For more recent analyses of collective representation and responsibility see Weisberg (1978) and Fiorina (1980) . 5 See Hurley (1982) , Herrera, Herrera, and Smith (1992) , Erikson, Wright and McIver (1994) , and Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) .
6 Carey (n.d.) provides numerous quotes by legislators in Latin America consistent with these arguments. Uslaner (1991, page 54 ) makes a similar argument for the U.S.: "The introduction of recorded teller votes made members of the House more accountable to their constituents... the focus of attention shifted to pleasing groups back home rather than to making deals with other legislators." group can construct a set of bribes that will move policy anywhere it wants at virtually no cost. The group does this by exploiting the fact that it only needs the support of a majority of the legislature in order to obtain its preferred policy.
7 That is, outcome-based preferences are useless for preventing an interest group from distorting policy in its preferred direction.
In equilibrium, then, the group will "buy" policy equal to its ideal point. Also, in this equilibrium a large number of legislators will lose their bid for reelection.
If voters can observe roll calls and condition their voting behavior on their legislators' roll call records, then they can induce position-taking preferences in their legislators-that is, they can cause their legislators to act as if they had position-taking preferences. And, if legislators have position-taking preferences, then the interest group must typically pay a large amount in bribes to move policy in its direction. 8 This limits the extent to which an interest group distorts policy in equilibrium, resulting in legislative outcomes that most voters prefer to the group's ideal point. Thus, voters can use position-taking-based voting strategies to prevent interest groups from dominating the legislature. In fact, they must use such strategies. Most legislators prefer this situation as well, either because they are reelected more often or receive larger bribes.
To make the preceding argument precise, we employ a variant of the model in Snyder (1991) , together with the insights on optimal bribes in Dal-Bo (2001) . In addition to capturing the basic logic just sketched, the model generates several results that deserve mention.
First, unlike previous work where legislators have position-taking preferences, in our model legislators' position-taking preferences are endogenous. Previous models focus on the legislative process, and simply assume that legislators have position-taking preferences of some exogenously given form. 9 We assume that players care about outcomes, and derive position-taking as part of the equilibrium, through voters' electoral strategies and legislators' desires to hold office. In the simplest case, the induced position-taking preferences imply that all legislators are equally costly for the lobbyist to bribe. This cost is larger, the more 7 Snyder (1991) discusses this briefly. Dal-Bo (2001) lays out the argument fully, and characterizes a set of optimal bribes for the interest group. The argument does not require the legislature to operate under a simple majority rule, but holds for any supermajority rule short of unanimity.
8 This is shown in Snyder (1991) , Groseclose (1996) , Dal-Bo (2001) , and elsewhere. 9 See, for example, Snyder (1991) , Groseclose (1996) , Groseclose and Snyder (1996) , Diermeier and Myerson (1999) , Dal-Bo (2001) , and Groseclose and Milyo (2001) . In addition, all of these papers except Snyder (1991) take the legislative agenda as exogenous.
legislators value their offices.
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Second, even when voters induce position-taking preferences, some legislators support the interest group's legislation. Some do this because their constituency prefers it, while others take bribes and forfeit their seats (unless the value of office is very high). Thus, the median voter is typically unable to obtain her first-best outcome. issue (e.g., how they vote), which gives interest groups less leverage over congress. CanesWrone assumes that groups have more leverage in the absence of this voter attention, but does not explain why this might be the case. Our model provides an explanation.
Before proceeding, three caveats concerning our analysis are in order.
First, we assume that there is only one organized group, or more generally, that all organized groups are on one side of the legislative median. Thus, our model is probably best applied to narrow regulatory questions in which the logic of collective action makes it likely that an intense, organized minority faces a disorganized mass of consumers or taxpayers.
11 It might also be applied to distributive issue areas such as agricultural policy (before the mid1970s), veterans affairs, ship building construction subsidies and merchant marine operating subsidies, public funding of medical research, various tax preferences, public works projects such as water projects, airports and hospitals, and grazing on federal lands. 12 It may also 10 This implies that the set of legislators supporting a group's proposal, and the set of legislators opposing the group, need not be ideologically "connected" coalitions divided by a single cut-point.
11 See, for example, Schattschneider (1960) and Olson (1965) . For a specific case, Price (1978, p. 551 ) describes communications policy as follows: "the preeminence of the commercial broadcasters renders communications less effectively pluralistic than most of Commerce's clientele centered areas."
12 See, for example, Ripley and Franklin (1980) . In his analysis of agricultural policy making, Hansen apply to some social regulation issues such as gun control, at least during some eras.
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Second, there are other ways to solve or partially solve the problems that arise due to the legislature's lack of bargaining power vis-a-vis interest groups, even if voters are unable to induce position-taking preferences. Legislators might be able to collude, and raise their prices by acting as monopolists or oligopolists (Dal-Bo, 2001 ). This might take the form of "strong" parties, which we examine in Section 4.2. Alternatively, the legislature might endow some legislators with veto power or gatekeeping power over certain issues or types of bills, forcing interest groups to pay significant amounts to a subset of legislators (as in Diermeier and Myerson, 1999) . This might take the form of strong committee chairmen.
Or, the legislature might operate under unanimity rule. This is unlikely to be an attractive option, however, since unanimity rule is likely to be costly for other reasons (e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) . Competition between groups might also solve the problem. If there are two or more well-financed groups with preferences on opposite sides of the legislative median, then the cost of moving policy away from the median will typically be large (e.g., Snyder and Groseclose, 1996) .
Third, there are other potential explanations for voter attention to position-taking activities. Voters might care directly about their members' policy preferences, because they have veto power, gatekeeping power, or monopoly proposal power on some issues. Positiontaking activities could then serve to signal these preferences Ting, 2002, 2003) .
(1991) notes: "By the 1960s, the farm lobby... had monopolized access to farm price support deliberations for an entire generation... The farm lobby faced no substantial competition for the loyalties of those in Congress who wrote the farm bills" (1991, p. 187) . The farm lobby's monopoly was not challenged until the 1970s. Wootton (1985) discusses veterans affairs, and quotes various observers: Steve Champlin, lobbyist for Vietnam Veterans of America, noted that the Veterans' Administration is "a $21 billion world that nobody pays attention to;" and Bill Keller said veteran's programs "are born and bred in an unusually closed system" (Wootton, 1985, p. 161) . Oppenheimer (1975) and Wootton (1985) discuss the politics of the oil depletion allowance and "intangible" oil drilling expenses. As Wootton notes, "Several groups (AF of L, National Grange, American Bureau Federation) were from time to time mildly critical of percentage depletion, but systematic and sustained opposition was lacking" (1985, p. 255) . With respect to the merchant marine, Price (1978) notes that while there is the potential for conflict, "the less-advantaged segments of the industry realized that, rather than questioning the benefits enjoyed by the subsidized lines, it was more fruitful to seek comparable benefits for themselves" (p. 558). See Strickland (1972) for an analysis of the narrow politics of medical research. Ferejohn (1974) describes the balance of forces on various rivers and harbors projects, and notes that flood control, water supply and beach erosion projects are particularly one-sided. 13 The distribution of PAC contributions provide one indication of how one-sided the gun control is: since 1990, gun rights groups (led by the National Rifle Association) have contributed ten times as much as gun control groups (see http://www.opensecrets.org/news/guns/). Alternatively, they might care about their legislator's preferences because he or she can use the legislative seat as a stepping stone to an executive office (in which capacity he or she will have veto power, gatekeeping power, or monopoly proposal power). Finally, Arnold (1990) argues that voters may focus on position-taking activities when deciding how to vote, because they are simply unable to evaluate the effect their legislator has on legislative outcomes. For scholars who agree with Arnold, our results are interesting because they show that voters may obtain the best attainable outcome even when they use strategies that appear unsophisticated.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section lays out the two basic models of legislative vote-buying and elections. Section 3 derives the main results for both legislative organizations. Section 4 develops extensions for legislator policy preferences, "strong" parties, and repeated play. Section 5 discusses some empirical implications. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
Our basic model has two variants, a closed one which does not feature publicly-known roll calls, and an open one which does. The only difference is that the latter allows voters to make their strategies contingent on their legislator's voting record. 14 Alternatively, we could analyze the open game alone, and compare optimal voter strategies that condition on roll calls with sub-optimal strategies that do not. Our approach follows standard game-theoretic treatments, in which all players employ optimal strategies in whatever game they are playing.
15 Thus, any family of single-peaked utility functions that are identical up to differences in ideal points satisfy our requirements. See Gans and Smart (1996) . rule, or a status quo of m. We assume that citizens break ties in favor of y.
The interest group, G, also cares about outcomes and may attempt to influence legislators' behavior by offering a payment, or bribe, for voting a certain way. These payments may represent campaign contributions, promises of future employment, or (in some environments) direct income transfers.
16 Let l ∈ {0, 1} N denote a roll call, where 1 denotes a vote for m.
Let b j (l) ≥ 0 denote the bribe offered by G to legislator j under l. This bribe may depend on the entire roll call, rather than only that legislator's vote. G then receives
where u G : X × X → is single-peaked in x and attains a maximum at g ∈ X.
Legislators each represent a single district. We assume that they value both holding office per se (and thus re-election) and bribes possibly offered by G. Legislator j receives
, where w > 0 represents a fixed benefit from holding office (i.e., getting reelected) and r j ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether she is re-elected. Note that legislators do not have policy preferences.
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Sequence. The sequence of play is as follows.
1. Interest Group Draw. Nature draws an interest group with ideal point g ∼ F , where
2. Vote Buying. G offers an alternative y ∈ X to m and, for each legislator, a schedule 16 If the group is interpreted as being another legislator, then the payments could also represent withinchamber benefits such as committee membership or future supporting votes.
17 As we will see in Section 4.1, policy preferences do not change the results of the basic model.
Election Voting.
In each district, each citizen simultaneously casts a re-election vote c i ∈ {0, 1}, where 1 denotes a vote for the incumbent. The outcome is determined by majority rule, where r j = 1 if and only if i∈d j c i ≥ (M j +1)/2.
Note that G would never need a bribe to achieve an outcome of m. Thus bribes over the binary agenda can be characterized by a single payment (for y) for each possible roll call.
Of course, G is assumed to be able to commit credibly to any promised bribe vector.
Strategies. G's strategy is a pair {y, b} consisting of a policy alternative y ∈ X and an N - 
Main Results: The Closed and Open Games
For both games, we characterize subgame perfect Nash equilibria, using weakly dominant strategies where possible. A further refinement is necessary since citizens are indifferent among all voting strategies, as legislators choose policy prior to the election. We therefore impose the following pivotal voting requirement: for citizen i, c i is chosen to maximize the legislator's incentive to vote as the citizen would in the (possibly out of equilibrium) event that he is pivotal in that period's election, given the information available to him. Thus, citizens preferring m to y will vote to re-elect their legislator if and only if the outcome is m in the closed game, and if and only if the legislator voted for m in the open game. We will refer to equilibria satisfying these requirements as PVSPE.
Loosely speaking, this refinement may be justified as follows. Consider a sequence of 'trembled' versions of each game in which each legislator and each citizen in her district are pivotal in their respective votes with positive (and diminishing) probability.
18 Then the refinement is equivalent to the optimal voting contracts for citizens to offer to legislators.
Alternatively, it selects the equilibrium that is optimal for pivotal legislators and voters (i.e., legislators are re-elected, and voters receive their optimal policy) in the trembled games. The pivotal voting rules then represent the limit of these contracts or equilibria as the trembles diminish to zero.
It will be convenient to define for each proposal y a 'supporting' set P (y) of districts with median voters that prefer y to m. Formally,
The single-peakedness of voter preferences implies that if y < m, then P (y) contains the 'leftmost' districts when it is non-empty (i.e., those with median voters m k for all m k ≤ y).
P (y) may also contain a district k with median voter m k ∈ (y, m). It cannot contain any
for all y = m.
The Closed Game
Since roll calls are not observable, the pivotal voting strategy for citizen i (who lives in district j) is:
Each district will re-elect its legislator if and only if the legislative outcome is preferred by a majority of citizens there. Because citizen preferences are single-peakedness and satisfy single-crossing, re-election occurs if the district median prefers the outcome to the defeated alternative. Since a majority of districts will prefer m to any y, a majority of legislators will remain in office only if y = m is defeated.
19
In the absence of bribes, these voting strategies present the legislator representing district j with a unique weakly dominant strategy: l j = 0 (i.e., vote for y) if and only if her district is in P (y). This ensures that m prevails against any y, and that legislators are defeated if and only if they represent districts in P (y).
G will therefore offer bribes if it can achieve a better outcome than m at a sufficiently
19 By (1), legislators are also re-elected if y = m, in which case y technically defeats m.
low cost. Suppose b takes the following form for any y:
for some η > 0 and > 0. 20 That is, G promises a payment large enough to compensate legislator j for losing the election if and only if she votes for y and is pivotal. Those voting against their district and not pivotal receive only .
Given the voters' responses, all legislators vote for y (i.e., l j = 0 for all j). To see why,
note that no legislator is ever pivotal under this contract. Suppose that exactly (N −1)/2 legislators are voting for y. Then any legislator voting for m would switch in order to collect w+η and be removed from office rather than receive w from re-election or 0 from being voted out. But if the number of legislators voting for y is not (N −1)/2, then any legislator voting for m would not be pivotal. She could switch her vote to y and receive instead of zero if y passes, or w+ instead of w if y fails. Importantly, this logic holds for any y. Letting y = g and → 0, G can therefore achieve its ideal policy while paying zero bribes.
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While the bribe defined by (2) is one of the simplest that works for any y, other bribes may also achieve the same result. It is easy to show, however, that the payoffs from the subgame induced by (2) are uniquely optimal for G. The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 1. Policy and bribes in the closed game. In a PVSPE, x c = y * = g and b j * = 0 for all legislators.
Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Thus, in a world without roll calls, it is surprisingly easy for the group to receive its ideal policy. This occurs because G has access to more observables than citizens, as well as the ability to take into account the externalities generated by legislators' actions. Intuitively, these allow G to write much more precise contracts to legislators than citizens can. The equilibrium clearly benefits districts with median voters that are at least as extreme as g along with their legislators. But a majority of voters in a majority of districts (i.e., those not in P (g)) do worse in this world than one in which no bribes can be offered.
The Open Game
The stark results of the previous section are generated in part by the lack of observables for citizens to 'contract' on. We now turn to the case where roll calls can be used to serve this purpose.
As in the closed game, citizens are indifferent among all voting strategies. With observable roll calls, the pivotal voting strategy for citizen i (who lives in district j) is:
Thus, each district conditions on its legislator's vote (and not the outcome), and re-elects her if and only if she votes for its median voter's preferred policy. 22 This implies that each legislator will have a reservation value of w. Without bribes, legislators always vote with their district medians, m always prevails, and all legislators are re-elected.
Consider any arbitrary proposal y. Legislators representing districts in P (y) have a dominant strategy of voting for y, while given (3), others require a sufficiently large compensation for losing office. Thus to win the vote of a legislator in a district j where d j ∈ P (y), b j (l) must assume the following form:
for some η > 0. Legislator j's best response to such a proposal {y, b} is therefore:
To achieve y, G therefore must "buy" the votes of any combination of (N +1)/2 − |P (y)| legislators, at a price of w+η each. G therefore solves:
22 With public roll calls many other voting strategies are possible, though none can do better than a pivotal voting strategy. For example, if all citizens conditioned on whether the legislator is pivotal, then G could achieve a result similar to that of the closed game. follows that for any set of policies such that |P (y)| is constant, the optimal policy alternative for G to propose is either the maximum of that set, or g if it is contained within. Thus:
The optimal policy proposal depends on w and the configuration of district median voter preferences. 23 For w sufficiently large (e.g., w > u G (g) − u G (m)), G will propose y = m and zero bribes. 23 The solution to this problem may not be unique. However, any configuration of preferences that leads to multiple solutions is not robust to small perturbations in voter preferences.
24 Note that if y = m, by (3) all legislators vote for y and are re-elected. 
Numerical Example
The following simple numerical example illustrates the equilibria of the open game. Let X = and N = 11. Assume that utilities for district median voters are quadratic, with u j (x) = −(x−j) 2 in district j, so that m j = 0, 1, . . . , 10. G's utility is also quadratic, with
The following table shows the equilibrium policy and bribe amounts as g and w vary. Since the median voters' utility functions are symmetric, all districts such that m j > (y + m)/2 (m j < (y + m)/2) will be in P (y) if y > m (y < m). Thus, all policies in the interval (5+2k, 7+2k] for k = 0, . . . , 4 command the support of exactly 5−k legislators in the absence of bribes, and thus all "cost" w(k+1). G therefore chooses among m, g, and the policy closest to g on each such interval contained in [m, g] . Note that equilibrium policy approaches m as w increases, but bribes are not monotonic in w. This is because an increase in w increases the cost of any given non-median policy, but also causes G to seek a more moderate position.
Extensions

Policy-and Office-Motivated Legislators
Given that the analysis above is simplified by the lack of policy preferences (thus creating a uniform "price" for each office), it is natural to ask whether the results are robust to the introduction of policy-motivated legislators. Thus, let legislator j receive wr
where u j L : X → is single-peaked and attains a maximum at m j . In other words, legislator j's preferences match those of the median voter in her district.
It is easy to see that this specification does not change the result of the closed game: since the contract (2) causes no legislator to be pivotal, the policy component of each legislator's utility is irrelevant to her voting decision. More importantly, the result of the open game is also essentially unchanged. There are two cases. First, G may buy a coalition of (N +3)/2 (i.e., one more than a majority) legislators. Since no legislator is pivotal in this case, policy utility is again irrelevant and each legislator can be bought at price w. Second, if w is sufficiently high, then G may prefer simply to compensate the least expensive (N +1)/2 − |P (y)| legislators representing districts in D \ P (y) by the difference in utility between m and y.
25 In both cases, policy utility increases somewhat the equilibrium cost of a winning coalition, thereby moderating policies relative to the open game.
Comment 2. With policy-and office-motivated legislators, the equilibrium outcomes and proposals satisfy: (i) x c = y * = g in the closed game; and (ii) 
Strong (Majority) Parties
One way for legislators to gain leverage against the interest group is to raise their prices through collusion. Here we examine the possibility that cohesive "parties" can play this role.
We mostly restrict attention to the closed game, but briefly consider the open game later.
To keep the analysis tractable, we make very simple assumptions about the composition and behavior of parties. A party is an exogenous collection of legislators whose objective is to maximize the sum of its members' payoffs (either through re-election or bribes). Each legislator may belong to at most one party, and each party must contain at least two members.
We index parties by π, and let N π denote the size of party π. Each party maintains perfect discipline, so that all members vote identically on any roll call. Thus, the closed game remains unchanged, except that legislator j has no voting strategy l j if she belongs to a party (say π).
Instead, party π has a voting strategy p π : X × B N → {{0} Nπ , {1} Nπ } mapping a proposal y and a bribe vector b into N π votes for or against y.
The analysis of the game is simplified by the following observation: without a majority party, equilibrium bribes and legislative outcomes are identical to those in Proposition 1.
The result continues to hold because G can, by offering a bribe schedule identical to (2), cause no legislator or party to be pivotal for any proposal y. Each party π will then vote for y because doing so will result in a payment of N π more than voting for m. A majority party is always pivotal, and thus can charge a non-zero price for delivering its votes. We thereby lose no generality by assuming the existing of a single, majority party that contains legislators from districts D π .
To build a winning coalition, G clearly needs only to secure the votes of the party. In the absence of bribes, for any proposal y, the party receives φ π (y)w for voting for y, and (N π − φ π (y))w for voting for m, where φ π (y) = |P (y) ∩ D π | is the number of districts represented by party legislators that prefer y to m. The total cost to G of receiving policy
As (7) makes clear, a cohesive majority party can raise the price of a winning coalition substantially. Two examples with legislators 1, . . . , (N+1)/2 belonging to the party illustrate the range of party influence. First, if g > m, then φ π (y) = 0 for any y > m and G must pay (N + 1)w/2 to achieve any such y. G therefore chooses between receiving m at zero cost or g at cost (N +1)w/2. Note that ideological diversity in the party lowers G's cost, in the sense that adding a legislator from a district favoring g over m would lower the cost by 2w. Second, if m (N−1)/2 < g < m, then φ π (y) ≥ N π /2 and the party will vote for g without payment. It does so even though the legislator representing the median district will not be re-elected, because most party members will be re-elected.
These examples are special cases of the following result, which applies (7) to establish the conditions under which Proposition 1 holds.
Comment 3. In the closed game with a cohesive majority party, the equilibrium legislative outcome x 
Thus x c π is always at least as moderate as x c , and g may be attained at zero cost only if a majority of party district medians is both more extreme than G and on the same side as m. 26 Otherwise, the party can effectively charge a price that would allow it to receive its reservation utility (of approximately N π w/2). This gives G an incentive to moderate its policy proposal. Under some conditions, G may settle for m, though it may also "buy" g if it cares enough about policy.
The analysis here suggests three rationales for a cohesive majority party in a world with closed proceedings. First, most voters weakly benefit from the more moderate legislative outcomes. Second, this moderation also weakly improves all legislators' re-election prospects.
These benefits exist even in districts not represented by the majority party. Finally, when bribes are strictly positive parties may redistribute them to their losing incumbents.
We note finally that party cohesion would not be as appealing to legislators in the analogous open game. This is because each legislator in the open game can guarantee herself a payoff of w when acting independently, while a party can collectively guarantee its members only about N π w/2. The model therefore provides one reason for expecting reduced party cohesion when roll calls are made public, or when voters pay more attention to roll calls.
Repeated Play
The infinitely repeated variants of the closed and open games serve two purposes. First, they establish that the strategies of the one-shot games are supportable as equilibria in an infinitely repeated game. In particular, they establish that pivotal voting strategies are optimal for securing long run policy benefits for citizens. Second, the policy results provide an additional rationale for open proceedings.
In both the closed and open games, each period is structurally identical to the corresponding stage games. We therefore preserve the notation of the previous sections, but now index periods with a subscript t where appropriate. Legislators are assumed to live for as long as they are re-elected, and each defeated legislator is replaced by a new one in the sub-sequent period. 27 Citizens are infinitely-lived, while groups survive for only a single period each. The ideal points {g t } of the groups {G t } are i.i.d. draws from F . In each period, all players receive the same utilities as in the one-shot game, and all players discount future payoffs by a common factor δ.
Strategies are now defined as follows. Let H P t represent the history of publicly observable moves (i.e., group draws, citizen votes, and policy and election outcomes) prior to period t. Similarly, let H b t and H l t , represent the histories of group offers and legislator votes, respectively. G t 's strategy maps the entire game history into a policy and bribe vector: The analysis is simplified considerably by the following observations. Because of stationarity and the fact that all legislators have identical preferences, citizens must be indifferent between candidates at each election. Thus, v i c is independent of c i t . As in the single period games, all citizen voting strategies, including pivotal voting strategies, are thereby supportable in subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Further, the optimal expected equilibrium policies for each voter result from inducing the best "myopic" performance from his legislator in each period. This requires that c i t reward the legislator for voting as the citizen would, in the event that a legislator is pivotal in determining x t , and citizen i is pivotal in determining whether she is re-elected. It then follows that in each period of the repeated games, citizens would wish to use pivotal voting strategies, as defined in (1) Recall that all legislators have identical utility functions, so the replacement mechanism is immaterial.
point is located at g. The following result characterizes the equilibrium policy and bribes in a stationary PVSPE.
Proposition 3. Policy and bribes in the repeated games. In a stationary PVSPE: (i)
x c t = y * t = g t , and j b j * t = 0 in the closed game; and (ii) The key intuition behind these results is that repetition may drive the reservation valueand hence price-of each legislator up from w to w/(1 − δ). In the closed game, this has no effect for the same reason as in the single period game. Groups can still exploit the externalities created by other legislators' votes, causing no legislators to be pivotal and thereby buying their ideal policies at zero cost. In the open game, however, there exists a voting strategy (i.e., vote with their district) that gives each legislator the ability to stay in office forever. Hence, v j l = w/(1−δ) and groups must pay the higher reservation values to each legislator. This reduces the relative attractiveness of the single-period solution (defined in (6)). Thus, policies can be no more extreme than in the one-shot open game.
Finally, it is worth noting that the results of Proposition 3 might change significantly if politicians were heterogeneous with respect to w. In this case, citizen voting strategies would need to solve both "adverse selection" as well as moral hazard problems. As a result, citizens will have an incentive to keep "good" (i.e., high w) types in office, since these will be more expensive for groups to buy. But, if such types were always re-elected, groups could then buy their votes cheaply. A similar tension would exist if w remained homogeneous, but legislators were either term-limited or finitely-lived. In this case, citizens would always find "younger" legislators to be more desirable than older ones, and therefore the extent to which the former could be controlled by pivotal voting-like strategies will be limited.
Empirical Implications
As noted above, our results apply when there is only one organized group, or when all organized groups are on the same side of the overall median. If there are organized groups on both sides, then competition among the groups is likely to produce more moderate outcomes under either open or closed procedures, making roll calls less necessary. Most situations in which all organized groups are on the same side involve cases where the organized interests are business, trade, or professional associations-i.e., "conservative" groups.
28 "Liberal" and "progressive" groups, such as labor and environmental groups, almost always face organized business or trade association opposition. We therefore expect to find that "liberal" groups and legislators have a strong preference for open procedures, and to find that the groups and legislators that support closed procedures tend to be conservative.
Empirically this appears to be the case. We have found a number of cases in which it holds, and no clear counterexamples. A few examples from the progressive era are illustrative.
In Minnesota in 1909, Haines (1910) reports that on a proposal to change the rules to "compelling every committee to keep a complete public record of all its acts", the vote was as follows: 90% of "progressives" voted in favor of the proposal, while only 22% of the nonprogressives voted in favor (the measure was tabled). Schattschneider (1960, page 31) argues: "The business character of the pressure system is shown by almost every list available... The business or upper-class bias of the pressure system shows up everywhere." And, Olson (1965, page 143) writes: "The multitude of workers, consumers, white-collar workers, farmers, and so on are organized only in special circumstances, but business interests are organized as a general rule." See also Schlozman (1984) .
29 See Haines (1910) (2001) show that liberals were significantly more supportive of these reforms than conservatives.
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Many observers attribute important policy shifts directly to congressional reforms requiring recorded votes: "The recorded teller vote soon bore spectacular fruits. Committee decisions, which had seldom been overturned on the floor, were soon being challenged in the glare of national publicity" (Bibby and Davidson, 1972, page 276) . One example is the elimination of funding for the supersonic transport in 1971 (Bibby and Davidson, 1972) .
Another is the repeal of the oil depletion allowance. Until 1973, tax bills were reported by 32 See, e.g., "Progressives Call for Radical Laws; House Faces Tie-Up" New York Times, December 1, 1923. 33 Lakeland Ledger, http://www.fsne.org/sunshine/lakeland.html. 34 Schickler, McGhee and Sides (2001) also show that representatives with more seniority tended to oppose the reforms. In fact, most of the opposition among Democrats came from committee chairs and party leaders. For example, on the most divisive Senate roll call on closed committee meetings, only 7 Democrats voted to relax the requirements on closed meetings, and 6 of these were committee chairs or party leaders. This behavior is consistent with our model, if we add the assumption that committee chairs and party leaders have some monopoly proposal rights and can collect payments from the interest groups in exchange for introducing bills. In such a model, committee chairs and party leaders will tend to oppose a move from the closed procedure to the open procedure. Under the open procedure the group must buy a less desirable proposal at a higher price, leaving it with a smaller surplus, and therefore with a smaller surplus to divide with committee chairs and party leaders.
the Ways and Means committee under a closed rule, meaning that none of the special provisions in the bill were voted on individually-from the point of view of our model, groups seeking these provisions faced a closed legislature. In 1973 the Democratic caucus enacted a reform allowing the caucus to instruct the Rules committee to allow a floor vote on a specific amendment to a bill. It was invoked in 1975 to force roll calls on amendments to eliminate or scale back the oil depletion allowance, and the amendment to repeal the allowance passed.
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Our model has several other implications, which may be amendable to empirical tests.
First, following a switch from closed to more open procedures there should be an increase in the degree of "responsiveness" between legislators' roll call voting behavior and the preferences or their voters. Second, following such a switch there should also be an increase in the reelection rate of incumbents. Third, as noted above, we might also expect to see a decline in party cohesion, especially inside the majority party. Fourth, the model suggests that there should be a negative correlation between "majority party strength" in a legislature and the use of roll calls. It may not be too difficult to test this proposition, say by looking across U.S. states, or perhaps cross-nationally. Finally, our model provides a rationale for the emphasis in some current research on the importance of the majority party's ability to organize the legislature and control its members.
36 A pure "brand name" explanation for party cohesion cannot easily account for a difference between the majority and minority parties, since the minority party has just as much incentive to create and promote its brand name as the majority party. In our model only a cohesive majority party can provide collective benefits to legislators in the form of better policies and/or transfers from interest groups.
Concluding Remarks
The model above shows that when voters base their voting decisions on their legislator's individual roll call voting records, they can prevent interest groups from dominating legislative decision making. If voters cannot or do not employ such strategies, then interest groups 35 This required a petition by 50 Democrats, followed by a majority vote in the Democratic caucus. The reform was also invoked in 1974 on amendments to eliminate the oil depletion allowance and tax credits for oil companies foreign tax payments, but Wilbur Mills then employed procedural manuevers to keep the bill off the floor. See Strahan (1990) , pp. 34-36, for details.
36 See, for example, Rohde (1991) , Rohde (2000, 2001) , Cox and McCubbins (1993 , Cambell, Cox and McCubbins (2002) .
can exploit the externalities that arise when bribes are possible and a legislature operates under majority rule, and obtain their most-preferred policy while paying almost no bribes in equilibrium. Position-taking-based voting strategies prevent interest groups from exploiting this externality, and sharply raise the costs of obtaining favorable policies. Citizens therefore have an incentive to favor open procedures that make such strategies possible, and because of their effect on re-election rates, legislators do as well. It is worth emphasizing that these incentives exist even though players care about outcomes, and not position-taking per se.
It is tempting to ask how much voters might gain by this in practice. The following calculation, while highly speculative, provides some food for thought. Groseclose and Milyo (1999) and Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2002) estimate the value of a U.S. House seat to be roughly $700,000-$3,000,000. This is what it would cost to convince a sitting House member to leave congress rather than run for re-election, and therefore corresponds closely to the parameter w in our model. Suppose that the actual value is $1,000,000. If an interest group needs to buy 100 members to pass its bill, then the total cost is $100,000,000.
37 Of course, there is also some chance that the congressmen and group are found guilty of accepting and offering bribes. Factoring in these probabilities can sharply increase the costs and decrease the expected benefits. For example, suppose the probability of being found guilty of bribery is 1−p, and if this occurs then the bribes are forfeited to the government, policy reverts to the status quo (the median), and both the congressmen and interest group officials serve some time in jail. Then congressmen must be paid at least $1, 000, 000/p each, and the total cost is $100, 000, 000/p. Also, the interest group only achieves its policy goals with probability p, so the value of the policy must be at least $100, 000, 000/p 2 . For p = .25, this is $1,600,000,000, and for p = .1 it is $10,000,000,000. This is starting to look like real money, especially since the policy is only being "rented"-the current bribes do not bind future legislators, who will prefer to return policy to the median unless they, too, receive sufficient bribes. (ii) To achieve any y, G has two options. First, it may buy any combination of (N + 
